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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Jones v. Barnes 
No. 81-1794 
February 22, 1983 
I. Question Presented 
Did the CA2 err in holding that, on appeal from a criminal con-
viction, the 6th and 14th A's require assigned appellate counsel to 
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the deft? 
II. Facts 
Resp was convicted of robbery and assault. A new attorney, 
Michael Melinger, was appointed to represent resp on appeal. Resp 
informed the attorney by letter of a number of points he wanted 
2 • 
raised on appeal, including that he had been denied effective assis-______,. 
tance of trial counsel. Resp accompanied his letter with a prose 
supplemental brief. Melinger responded, however, that he would not 
argue the ineffective assistance claim, although he identified a 
number of other points he intended to pursue. Resp then prepared a 
supplemental prose brief, and Melinger and resp each submitted 
briefs to the NY App. Div., although at oral argument Melinger as-
serted none of the arguments raised in the prose briefs. Resp's 
conviction was affirmed by order. The NY Ct. App. denied leave to 
appeal. After his first federal habeas petn was denied (an 
ineffective-of-trial-counsel claim for failure to introduce certain 
evidence), resp petitioned the NY Ct. App. for reconsideration. 
That petn also was denied. 
III. Proceedings Below 
Resp then filed this habeas action, essentially arguing that 
his appellate representation had been ineffective. The DC concluded 
that resp had exhausted his state remedies by alleging ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in his petn for reconsideration be-
fore the NY Ct. App. The DC denied relief on the merits, however, 
concluding that Melinger had provided reasonably competent represen-
tation: "It is not required that an attorney argue every conceivable 




among potential issues, according to his judgment as to their merit 
and his tactical approach." 
The CA2 reversed. It agreed that resp had exhausted his state 
remedies, because he had properly presented his ineffective assis-
tance argument in his rehearing petn to the Ct. App. On the merits, 
however, the CA2 concluded that, when "the appellant requests that 
[his attorney] raise additional colorable points [on appeal], coun-
sel must argue the additional points to the full extent of his pro-
fessional ability." This conclusion follows from Anders v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), where the Court held that an appointed 
attorney must advocate his client's cause vigorously. While Anders 
acknowledged that attorneys need not press frivolous appeals, the 
Court held that an attorney may not withdraw from a nonfrivolous 
appeal. "By extension, Anders instructs that" an attorney is simi-
larly barred from abandoning a nonfrivolous issue. The CA2 conclud-
ed that, "[h)aving demonstrated that appointed counsel failed to 
argue colorable claims at his request, an appellant need not also 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of those claims." 
Applying these principles to the facts here, the CA2 concluded 
that Melinger had erred. His failure to press resp's claims had not 
been cured by his submission of resp's pro se briefs to the NY App. 
Div. And resp had urged Melinger to press at least two claims that 
were nonfrivolous: ( i) the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, whose .,_____---_...-
failure both to challenge the TC's ruling on the psychiatric testi-
mony and to call resp's father as an alibi witness may, under NY 
de9isions, have constituted error of constitutional dimensions; and 
(ii) the TC's refusal to offer an accessorial liability instruction. 
4. 
The CA2 concluded by noting that decisions involving strategy and 
tactics are committed to the attorney, but that the lawyer's discre-
tion does not extend to the decision to forego potentially meritori-
ous claims. 
He accepted the majority's conclusion 
that resp had exhausted his state remedies. But he maintained that 
the court had overextended Anders. In his view, that case reached 
only an attorney's attempt to abandon nonfrivolous appeals; it did 
t , 
not suggest that attorneys are barred from declining to advance 
nonfrivolous issues. To the contrary, Anders recognized that attor-
neys are those best able to make legal judgments. Thus an 
appellante lawyer might conclude for tactical reasons to forego mak-
ing certain claims. And even accepting the majority's legal stand-
ard, Judge Meskill rejected the court's characterization of the 
record: "The record does not support the conclusion that [resp] did 
more than suggest certain claims to his lawyer and accept his law-
yer's judgment that these claims were not useful." 
IV. Summary of the Parties' Contentions 
A. Petr. By its decision, the CA2 has established a standard 
for the performance of appellate counsel that will undermine rather :X--than promote effective representation of indigent defts on appeal. --- ~ ,-.......--._.- :__, 
This standard has no basis in the Constitution and threatens to in-
terfere substantially with the orderly administration of the appel-
late process. In order to provide reasonably competent representa-
tion, appellate attorneys must be allowed to select issues for pres-
entation to an appellate court in accordance with their professional • 
judgment. 
5. 
Althought the CA2 faults counsel for not yielding to deft's 
requests to raise several specific issues, no such request can be 
f = d. The court relies on the fact that deft chose 
to supplement his counsel's work by filing several prose briefs, 
but those briefs, signed by deft as co-counsel to his assigned coun-
sel, do not constitute a request to raise the issues contained in 
them. The court also relies on the fact that counsel wrote a letter 
to deft identifying a number of potential issues for appeal, and 
then omitted some of those issues from his brief, but that letter 
from counsel to deft does not constitute a request from deft to 
counsel. 
In any event, the omitted issues were frivolous, or at best 
barely colorable. Deft's inability to demonstrate that he suffered 
any prejudice by the omission of the claims compels the conclusion 
that the CA2 erred in granting the habeas writ. 
2. Resp. The CA2 was correct in holding that the constitu-
tional right to counsel and equal access to the courts requires as-
signed counsel to advocate, on direct appeal of a criminal convic- / 
tion, those issues urged on him by his indigent client. The CA2's 
opinion confirms the traditional role of counsel to evaluate the 
case and consult with his client in the determination of the issues 
to be raised on appeal. In the few instances in which a client de-
sires to participate in the appellate process and insists, despite 
his lawyer's advice to the contrary, that particular colorable is-
sues be presented, the client's decision must control. 
, It is settled that the client, and not his attorney, maintains 
the absolute right to determine whether he will appeal from his 
6 • 
judgment of conviction. The only way to assure judicial consider-
ation of a particular claim of error is to address the issue in the 
brief. Indeed, in light of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 
(1977), issues not raised may well be foreclosed forever from re-
view. 
The CA2 unanimously found that the issues counsel in this case 
refused to raise were colorable. Indeed, in light of the weakness 
of the prosecutions's case, it appears that the issues resp wanted 
counsel to raise in the appellate division would have substantially 
improved his chance for reversal. In any event, counsel's abandon-
ment of resp on those issue, thereby denying him access to the 
court, requires that the writ be granted without any additional 
showing of prejudice. 
V. Discussion 
A. Request. Given the CA2's holding, the first issue is 
whether there was any request by resp that certain issues be raised. 
The CA2 relied on the fact that deft chose to file several prose 
briefs. I am inclined to agree with Judge Meskill that the record 
does not support the conclusion that resp did more than suggest cer-
tain claims to his lawyer and that the filing of .P!.£ se briefs, 
signed by deft as co-counsel to appointed counsel, does not consti-
tute a request to counsel to raise the points that appear in the .P!.£ 
se briefs. 
Resp did, however, raise the claim of ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel in both his first letter to resp and in his prose brief 
sent in response to Melinger's request for suggestions. Although 
resp did not renew any suggestion that counsel raise the point other 
7 . 
than by filing his prose briefs, it is plausible to say that resp 
requested his appellate counsel to raise the ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim. If I were the DJ, I would say that, as a 
factual matter, there was no request, but I am less inclined to say 
that the CA2 was clearly erroneous in assuming that there was such a 
request. I think the Court would be safe to assume that resp re-
quested that at least the claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel be raised. ?t.--o f-~
. / . . f. f . B. Frivolousness. I do not think the claim o ine fective 
assistance of trial counsel can be considered frivolous. 
C. The Right. The CA2 could not, of course, rely on its 
"farce and mockery" standard 
right at issue here. Rather, it hat deci-
sion, in turn, was based on Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), 
and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), which relied gener-
ally on principles of fair process and equal justice drawn from the 
due process and equal protection Clauses of the 14th A. Neither 
_,,.....-- clause of the 5th A provides an entirely satisfactory basis for 
"fr?' evaluating the performance (rather than the availability) of counsel 
on direct appeal. 
This Court has never held that due process requires the State [ 
to furnish any right of appeal from a criminal conviction, see Abney 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (w/POWELL, J.), and it is 
not evident how the assistance of counsel becomes an essential ele-
ment of due process whenever the State elects to provide a right of 
appeal, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (w/POWELL, J.) 
("Unfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the State 
8. 
and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of 
their poverty."). Even more troublesome is whether due process re-
quires that an appellant be afforded an opportunity for a new appeal 
because his attornev n the exercise of what is "essentially a pri-
vate function," see Polk County v. Dodson, 102 U.S. 445, 450 (1981) 
(POWELL, J.), failed to make a particular argument. There is a sub-
stantial question whether such conduct of appellate counsel, whose 
independence the State is constitutionally obligated to respect, see 
id., at 451-452, can in any way be considered "state action" for 
purposes of the due process clause of the 14th A, at least where the 
state appellate court, in affirming the conviction, did not know or 
have reason to know of counsel's allegedly inadequate performance. 
To find state action would be to impose on the State responsibility 
for conduct for which it cannot fairly be blamed. 
Unless the Constitution requires a different level of compe-
tence for retained counsel on appeal--and the Court has not so held, 
cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342-345 (1980) (POWELL, J.)--
the State may not be said to have deprived an indigent appellant of 
the equal protection of the laws when appointed counsel does not 
satisfy the controlling standard of performance. Moreover, if a 
particular court-appointed attorney handles a case in an ineffective 
manner, that performance cannot necessarily be attributed to the 
appellant's indigency, rather than to variation in the training, 
experience, or dedication among attorneys generally, which non-
indigent appellants experience as well. It would not appear, in 
other words, that the State has treated indigents differently as a 
class, see Ross, 417 U.S., at 609, simply because the attorney ap-
.. 
~ 9. 
pointed to represent an indigent deft in a p ticular case performed 
dard manner. 
unlike Anders. Anders involved counsel's 
----'-' 
role of an amicus curiae. This case presents the narrow question 1~ 
every issue in a direct appeal (y whether appointed counsel must argue 
If the Court turns to the standards that guide an attorney's 
advocacy generally to define due process on direct appeal, it seems 
clear to me that an attorney has the ethical obligation to make 
nonfrivolous legal arguments that his client asks him to make. See 
ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-8 ("In the final 
analysis, ... the lawyer should always remember that the decision 
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of 
non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for 
himself."). But it is equally clear that raising every nonfrivolous 
argument is not generally effective advocacy. Thus, to find that 
the Constitution requires such a course may enforce ethical rules, 
but has little to do with fairness or "due process." 
E. Prejudice. Resp's contention is not that he was denied a . 
lawyer, but that his lawyer was ineffective. Therefore, his claim 
cannot provide a basis for relief unless he can show that his law-
yer's omissions had some likely effect on the outcome of the case. 
No such showing has been made. 
VI. Summary 
This case could probably be disposed of on the facts, but I 
think it is fair to assume that the issue presented is here. On the 
merits of that issue, I find no constitutional basis for the right 
10. 
identified by the CA2. I also find the policy arguments persuasive 
against finding a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous 
issue on appeal: My limited experience leads me to believe that such 
a tactic is not generally effective. 
I recommend reversing. 
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From: The Chief Justice 
MAY 2 4 1983 Circulated: _ ________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1794 
EVERETT W. JONES, SUPERINTENDENT, GREAT 
MEADOW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. DAVID BARNES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider whether defense counsel 
assigned to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction 
has a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue re-
quested by the defendant. 
I 
In 1976, Richard Butts was robbed at knifepoint by four 
men in the lobby of an apartment .building; he was badly 
beaten and his watch and money were taken. Butts in-
formed a Housing Authority Detective that he recognized 
one of his assailants as a person known to him as "Froggy," 
and gave a physical description of the person to the detective. 
The following day the detective arrested respondent David 
Barnes, who is known as "Froggy." 
Respondent was charged with first and second degree rob-
bery, second degree assault, and third degree larceny. The 
prosecution rested primarily upon Butts' testimony and his 
identification of respondent. 1 During cross-examination, 
1 This identification, which took place in a one-on-one meeting arranged 
by the police, was the subject of a pretrial hearing. The trial judge found 
it unnecessary to rule on the validity of that identification. He concluded 
2 
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defense counsel asked Butts whether he had ever undergone 
psychiatric treatment; however, no offer of proof was made 
on the substance or relevance of the question after the trial 
judge sua sponte instructed Butts not to answer. At the 
close of trial, the trial judge declined to give an instruction on 
accessorial liability requested by the defense. The jury con-
victed respondent of first and second degree robbery and sec-
ond degree assault. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New 
York, Second Department, assigned Michael Melinger to rep-
resent respondent on appeal. Respondent sent Melinger a 
letter listing several claims that he felt should be raised. 2 
Included were claims that Butts' identification testimony 
should have been suppressed, that the trial judge improperly 
excluded psychiatric evidence, and that respondent's trial 
counsel was ineffective. Respondent also enclosed a copy of 
a pro se brief he had written. 
In a return letter, Melinger accepted some but rejected 
most of the suggested claims, stating that they would not aid 
respondent in obtaining a new trial and that they could not be 
raised on appeal because they were not based on evidence in 
the record. Melinger then listed seven potential claims of 
error that he was considering including in his brief, and in-
vited respondent's "reflections and suggestions" with regard 
to those seven issues. The record does not reveal any re-
sponse to this letter. 
Melinger's brief to the Appellate Division concentrated on 
three of the seven points he had raised in his letter to re-
spondent: improper exclusion of psychiatric evidence, failure 
to suppress Butts' identification testimony, and improper 
that Butts' subsequent in-court identification was based upon an independ-
ent source, since Butts had known respondent for several years prior to the 
robbery. 
2 Respondent's letter is not in the record. Its contents may be inferred 
from Melinger's letter in response. 
81-1794--0PINION 
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cross-examination of respondent by the trial judge. In addi-
tion, Melinger submitted respondent's own pro se brief. 
Thereafter, respondent filed two more pro se briefs, raising 
three more of the seven issues Melinger had identified. 
At oral argument, Melinger argued the three points pre-
sented in his own brief, but not the arguments raised in the 
pro se briefs. On May 22, 1978, the Appellate Division af-
firmed by summary order, New York v. Barnes, 63 App. Div. 
2d 865, 405 N. Y. S. 2d 621 (2d Dept. 1978). The New York 
Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, New York v. 
Barnes, 45 N. Y. 2d 786 (1978). 
On August 8, 1978, respondent filed a pro se petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York. Respondent raised five 
claims of error, including ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel. The District Court held the claims to be without merit 
and dismissed the petition. United States ex rel. Barnes v. 
Jones, No. 78-C-1717 (EDNY, Nov. 27, 1978). The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 607 F. 2d 994, and 
we denied a petition for a writ of certiorari, 444 U. S. 853 
(1979). 
In 1980, respondent filed two more challenges in state 
court. On March 4, 1980, he filed a motion in the trial court 
for collateral review of his sentence. That motion was de-
nied on April 28, and leave to appeal was denied on October 
3. Meanwhile, on March 31, 1980, he filed a petition in the 
New York Court of Appeals for reconsideration of that 
court's denial of leave to appeal. In that petition, respond-
ent for the first time claimed that his appellate counsel, 
Melinger, had provided ineffective assistance. The New 
York Court of Appeals denied the application on April 16, 
1980, New York v. Barnes, 49 N. Y. 2d 1001 (1980). 
Respondent then returned to United States District Court 
for the second time, with a petition for habeas corpus based 
on the claim of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. 
The District Court concluded that respondent had exhausted 
4 
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his state remedies, but dismissed the petition, holding that 
the record gave no support to the claim of ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel on "any ... standard which could 
reasonably be applied." No. 80-C-2447 (EDNY, Jan. 30, 
1981), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, 28a. The Dis-
trict Court concluded: 
"It is not required that an attorney argue every conceiv-
able issue on appeal, especially when some may be with-
out merit. Indeed, it is his professional duty to choose 
among potential issues, according to his judgment as to 
their merit and his tactical approach." Id., at 28a-29a. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, 665 F. 
2d 427 (CA2 1981). 3 Laying down a new standard, the ma-
jority held that when "the appellant requests that [his attor-
ney] raise additional colorable points [ on appeal], counsel 
must argue the additional points to the full extent of his pro-
fessional ability." Id., at 433 (emphasis added). In the 
view of the majority, this conclusion followed from Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In Anders, this Court held 
that an appointed attorney must advocate his client's cause 
vigorously and may not withdraw from a nonfrivolous appeal. 
The Court of Appeals majority held that, since Anders bars 
counsel from abandoning a nonfrivolous appeal, it also bars 
counsel from abandoning a nonfrivolous issue on appeal. 
"[A]ppointed counsel's unwillingness to present particu-
lar arguments at appellant's request functions not only to 
abridge defendant's right to counsel on appeal, but also 
to limit the defendant's constitutional right of equal 
access to the appellate process. . .. " Ibid. 
3 By this time, at least 26 state and federal judges had considered re-
spondent's claims that he was unjustly convicted for a crime committed five 
years earlier; and many of the judges had reviewed the case more than 
once. Until the latest foray, all courts had rejected his claims. 
81-1794-0PINION 
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The Court of Appeals went on to hold that, "[h]aving demon-
strated that appointed counsel failed to argue colorable 
claims at his request, an appellant need not also demonstrate 
a likelihood of success on the merits of those claims." Id., 
at 434. 
The court concluded that Melinger had not met the above 
standard in that he had failed to press at least two 
nonfrivolous claims: the trial judge's failure to instruct on ac-
cessory liability and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
The fact that these issues had been raised in respondent's 
own pro se briefs did not cure the error, since "[a] pro se brief 
is no substitute for the advocacy of experienced counsel." 
Ibid. The court reversed and remanded, with instructions 
to grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the State assigned 
new counsel and granted a new appeal. 
Circuit Judge Meskill dissented, stating that the majority 
had overextended Anders. In his view, Anders concerned 
only whether an attorney must pursue nonfrivolous appeals; 
it did not imply that attorneys must advance all nonfrivolous 
issues. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1982), and we 
reverse. /4 
In announcing a new per se rule that appellate counsel 
must raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client, 4 
the Court of Appeals relied primarily upon Anders v. Cali-
fornia, supra. There is, of course, no constitutional right to 
an appeal, but in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1955), 
and Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court 
held that if an appeal is open to those who can pay for it, 
'The record is not without ambiguity as to what respondent requested. 
We assume, for purposes of our review, that the Court of Appeals majority 
correctly concluded that respondent insisted that Melinger raise the issues 
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an appeal must be provided for an indigent. It is also recog-
nized that the accused has the ultimate authority to make 
certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to 
whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her 
own behalf, or take an appeal, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U. S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (BURGER, C. J., concurring); ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2, 21-2.2 (2d ed. 1980). 
In addition, we have held that, with some limitations, a de-
fendant may elect to act as his or her own advocate, Faretta 
v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). Neither Anders nor any 
other decision of this Court suggests, however, that the indi-
gent defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed 
counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, 
if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not 
to present those points. 
This Court, in holding that a State must provide counsel 
for an indigent appellant on his first appeal as of right, recog-
nized the superior ability of trained counsel in the "examina-
tion into the record, research of the law, and marshalling 
of arguments on [the appellant's] behalf," Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U. S., at 358. Yet by promulgating a per se rule 
that the client, not the professional advocate, must be al-
lowed to decide what issues are to be pressed, the Court of 
Appeals seriously undermines the ability of counsel to 
present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional 
evaluation. 
Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have 
emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker argu-
ments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, 
or at most on a few key issues. Justice Jackson, after ob-
serving appellate advocates for many years, stated: 
"One of the first tests of a discriminating advocate is to 
select the question, or questions, that he will present 
orally. Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate 
through over-issue. The mind of an appellate judge is 
81-1794-OPINION 
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habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court 
committed an error. But receptiveness declines as the 
number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints 
at lack of confidence in any one .... [E]xperience on the 
bench convinces me that multiplying assignments of 
error will dilute and weaken a good case and will not 
save a bad one. " Jackson, Advocacy Before the Su-
preme Court, 25 Temple L. Q. 115, 119 (1951). 
Justice Jackson's observation echoes the advice of countless 
advocates before him and since. An authoritative work on 
appellate practice observes: 
"Most cases present only one, two, or three significant 
questions .... Usually, ... if you cannot win on a few 
major points, the others are not likely to help, and to at-
tempt to deal with a great many in the limited number of 
pages allowed for briefs will mean that none may receive 
adequate attention. The effect of adding weak argu-
ments will be to dilute the force of the stronger ones." 
R. Stern, Appellate Practice in the United States 266 
(1981). 5 
There can hardly be any question about the importance of 
having the appellate advocate examin~ the record with a 
view to selecting the most promising issues for review. This 
has assumed a greater importance in an era when oral argu-
ment is strictly limited in most courts-often to as little as 15 
minutes-and when page limits on briefs are widely imposed. 
See, e.g., Fed. Rules App. Proc. 28(g); McKinney's 1982 
New York Rules of Court §§ 670.17(g)(2), 670.22. Even in a 
5 Similarly, a manual on practice before the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit declares: "[A] brief which treats more than three or four 
matters runs serious risks of becoming too diffuse and giving the overall 
impression that no one claim of error can be serious. " Committee on Fed-
eral Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Appeals 
to the Second Circuit 38 (1980). 
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court that imposes no time or page limits, however, the new 
per se rule laid down by the Court of Appeals is contrary to 
all experience and logic. A brief that raises every colorable 
issue runs the risk of burying good arguments-those that, in 
the words of the great advocate John W. Davis, "go for the 
jugular," Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A. B. A. J. 
895, 897 (1940)-in a verbal mound made up of strong and 
weak contentions. See generally, e. g., Godbold, Twenty 
Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 
30 Sw. L. J. 801 (1976). 6 
This Court's decision in Anders, far from giving support to 
the new per se rule announced by the Court of Appeals, is to 
the contrary. Anders recognized that the role of the advo-
cate "requires that he support his client's appeal to the best 
of his ability." 386 U. S., at 744. Here the appointed coun-
• The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide: 
"A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by 
which they are to be pursued. . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall 
abide by the client's decision, ... as to a plea to be entered, whether to 
waive jury trial and whether the client will testify." Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Proposed Rule l.2(a) (Final Draft 1982) (emphasis 
added). 
With the exception of these specified fundamental decisions, an attorney's 
duty is to take professional responsibility for the conduct of the case, after 
consulting with his client. 
Respondent points to the ABA Standards for Criminal Appeals, which 
appear to indicate that counsel should accede to a client's insistence on 
pressing a particular contention on appeal, see ABA Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice 21-3.2, at 21-42 (2d ed. 1980). The ABA Defense Function 
Standards provide, however, that, with the exceptions specified above, 
strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the defense 
counsel, after consultation with the client. See ABA Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980). See also ABA Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function and The · Defense Function 
§ 5.2 (Tent. Draft 1970). In any event, the fact that the ABA may have 
chosen to recognize a given practice as desirable or appropriate does not 
mean that that practice is required by the Constitution. 
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sel did just that. For judges to second-guess reasonable 
professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a 
duty to raise every "colorable" claim suggested by a client 
would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advo-
cacy that underlies Anders. Nothing in the Constitution or 
our interpretation of that document requires such a standard. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly 
Reversed. 
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